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A B S T R A C T
We assess the impact of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) scheme, the world's largest
workfare scheme, on healthcare utilisation – specifically maternal healthcare. The primary objective of NREG is
to improve the income of rural households by guaranteeing 100 days of employment. We expect that by im-
proving household income, thereby reducing some of the financial barriers, such as out-of-pocket payments,
NREG can increase utilisation of maternal health services. Using a nationally representative household survey
and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the phased rollout of the scheme, we estimate the impact
of NREG on utilisation of maternal health services: mainly deliveries at health facilities. We find that NREG did
not increase overall facility deliveries, even though it led to an increase in deliveries at public facilities. There is
weak evidence to suggest that deliveries at private facilities reduced due to NREG. Furthermore, sub-group
analyses reveal that among poorer households, who are more likely to participate in NREG, there is a reduction
in facility deliveries while home deliveries increased. Among richer households, NREG increased deliveries at
public facilities. There was no impact on households belonging to marginalised castes. We conclude by dis-
cussing the possible mechanisms for these effects and its impact on equity in healthcare utilisation.
1. Introduction
Targeted transfers such as Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGS)
are often seen as a mechanism to achieve a number of developmental
objectives: provide employment to the poor, break the cycle of poverty
and create productive assets. Evidence shows that EGS schemes in de-
veloping countries such as Argentina (Ravallion et al., 2005) and South
Africa (Adato and Haddad, 2002) have had varying degrees of success
in achieving these objectives. More recently, researchers have started
investigating the effects of such schemes on other developmental out-
comes including education (Afridi et al., 2016; Das and Singh, 2013),
food security (Deininger and Liu, 2013; Ravi and Engler, 2015), and
health (Maity, 2017; Sharma, 2016). As its conceptual basis, research
investigating the impact of EGS as well as other workfare or cash-
transfer schemes on health utilisation, propose that the effect is pri-
marily the result of an improvement in the income of the household.
When members of a household participate in an EGS, their income
improves, and they are more likely to afford and utilise healthcare.
In this paper, we assess the impact of one of the largest EGS ever
implemented: India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (NREG), on utilisation of health services. As in the
case of other EGS, one of the primary objectives of NREG is to provide
income security to the most vulnerable sections of the population while
developing productive assets. Evidence shows that NREG has had an
impact on meeting this objective. Not only are the poor and margin-
alised caste more likely to participate in NREG (Jha et al., 2009; Liu and
Barrett, 2012), their income has also increased (Muralidharan et al.,
2017). Furthermore, research shows that by prioritising infrastructure
development projects, the scheme also enables sustainable development
of the community (Bhatia et al., 2016).
However, evidence on the effects of NREG on other development
outcomes such as health is lacking. In this paper, we address this gap in
evidence by studying the impact of NREG on healthcare utilisation.
NREG guarantees adult participants, both men and women, from rural
households one hundred days of work each year. By guaranteeing
gainful employment, especially during the lean agricultural season and
at a wage rate that is often higher than the minimum wage, NREG
promises to improve income security of poor households in rural areas;
therefore, reducing economic barriers to utilising healthcare. This ex-
pected effect of NREG on the utilisation is particularly relevant in India
where healthcare is largely financed through out-of-pocket (OOP)
payments and with increasing dependence on the private sector
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providers, healthcare costs are rising, and OOP payments are one of the
leading causes of household debt and poverty. It is estimated that
paying for healthcare pushes nearly 39 million Indians below the
poverty line every year (Balarajan et al., 2011).
To understand the effect of NREG on utilisation of health services,
we focus on maternal healthcare, mainly delivery at health facilities.
When NREG was introduced, only 39% of the deliveries in India were
conducted in health facilities; in rural areas it was just 29%. We also
study the differential effect of NREG by household wealth and caste.
Research shows that while schemes that promote facility deliveries by
providing cash incentives and free maternity care reduce some of the
barriers to seeking maternal healthcare, high OOP payments can still be
a stubborn deterrent (Mohanty and Srivastava, 2012). This deterrent is
more significant for poorer households – often from rural areas and
belonging to marginalised castes, leading to greater inequity in utili-
sation of maternal healthcare (Modugu et al., 2012).
In line with the objectives of an EGS like NREG; first, we expect to
see an increase in utilisation of maternal healthcare. This can be due to
a number of reasons including a direct effect from the increase in in-
come of participating households to an indirect effect on the entire
community. The indirect effect includes increase in overall wages in the
area, as well as better access to health facilities because of the infra-
structure development undertaken as part of the NREG work. Second,
we expect NREG to reduce inequity in utilisation. Since the scheme is
specifically designed to provide poorer households greater income se-
curity, we expect that because of NREG poorer households are more
likely to afford and use healthcare, thereby reducing inequity in utli-
sation.
In the following sections, we describe the study setting and the
NREG scheme, and present our empirical strategy which uses a differ-
ence-in-difference approach to assess the impact of NREG on utilisation
of maternal healthcare, specifically deliveries at health facilities. We
then present the results, which shows that although there is no change
in overall facility deliveries – deliveries at public facilities have in-
creased due to NREG. However, in the subgroup analyses, we find re-
sults contrary to our expectations. Amongst poorer households, we find
that facility deliveries decreased – including at public facility, while
home deliveries increased. Instead, amongst richer households, we find
deliveries at public facility increased but there is no impact on home
deliveries. Finally, we discuss the results in light of further analyses and




India, with a population of 1.3 billion, is the second populous
country and the largest democracy in the world. Close to 70% of its
population live in villages, where agriculture, including livestock, is the
principal source of livelihood. India's development indicators are poor.
Overall 22% of its population live below the poverty line and in 2015, it
accounted for 15% of all maternal deaths worldwide (WHO, 2015).
Over the years, many poverty reduction projects have been initiated
in India. One of the largest and perhaps the most ambitious is the NREG
scheme. Enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2005, NREG aims to
provide income security to households in rural areas. With an annual
budget of nearly 7 billion USD, during its first year of implementation
in 2006, nearly 21 million people were provided employment, and this
increased to 54.9 million by 2010 (Ministry of Rural Development,
2010). This makes NREG one of the largest workfare programme in the
world.
The scheme legally guarantees one hundred days of wage employ-
ment to every rural household with adult members willing to perform
unskilled manual work. The nature of work i.e. unskilled manual labour
screens out non-poor households while increasing the likelihood of
households who self-identify as poor to participate. Women and mar-
ginalised caste groups i.e. scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC/
ST) are prioritised for work and consequently, since 2009, they con-
stitute almost half of the participants (Ministry of Rural Development,
2010). The scheme is available in only rural areas and is managed by
the decentralised institutions in the village (Gram Panchayats) that
ensure employment is provided within fifteen days of application and
within 5 km of the household. Otherwise, households are entitled to
claim unemployment or travel allowance. Employment is in the public
sector with priority given to developmental work in water conservation
and harvesting, drought proofing, irrigation, land development, flood
control, and improving all-weather access.
The implementation of NREG has partially met the targets that were
initially set out. For instance, the recorded number of days worked
under NREG is much lower than the target of one hundred days. In its
first year of implementation, participating households were employed
for only 43 person days on average, which increased to 48 days by
2008/09 (World Bank, 2011). Only 10 per cent of participating
households exhausted their hundred days’ entitlement in 2006/07,
which increased to 14 per cent by 2008/09. Furthermore, while
awareness of NREG is relatively high, awareness of some key elements
of the scheme remains low. For example, people know about the one
hundred days of guaranteed work but are not aware of their entitlement
to an unemployment allowance if work is not provided within fifteen
days (World Bank, 2011).
A number of researchers acknowledge that while the implementa-
tion of NREG is not perfect, it has still achieved significant progress in
the overall development objectives. There is a growing body of evi-
dence to suggest a net positive impact of NREG on the overall devel-
opment of rural poor households in several areas such as food security
(Ravi and Engler, 2015), reducing stress migration to urban cities
(NCEUS, 2009), reducing child labour (Uppal, 2009) and increasing
access to education (Afridi et al., 2016). Some studies have also high-
lighted the crucial role of the scheme in breaking the cycle of poverty.
For instance, evidence suggests that in certain villages in Andhra Pra-
desh, a state that is prone to catastrophic crop failure, which is often to
blame for extreme poverty and farmer suicides, 85 percent of the NREG
wages were being spent on food, clothing, health, education and debt
repayment (Kannan and Breman, 2013) – indicating how the income
from the scheme is often used in meeting the basic needs of the
household. A larger national study further found the majority of the
NREG participants are relatively more vulnerable such as from poorer
households, SC/ST, or women (NCEUS, 2009).
2.2. Empirical strategy
To estimate the impact of NREG by comparing beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries would give biased estimates as the scheme was not
randomised. However, the phased rollout of the scheme provides a
quasi-natural experimental design which we can exploit. NREG was
rolled out in three phases. In Phase 1 (February 2006), the scheme was
introduced in 200 backward districts; an additional 130 districts were
included in Phase 2 (April 2007), and the remaining districts were in-
cluded in Phase 3 (April 2008). We employ difference-in-differences
(DID) that uses the fact that the scheme was implemented in different
districts at different times to distinguish between the “treatment” and
“control” districts. We use Phase 1 districts as the treatment group and
Phase 3 districts as the control group and consider January 2004 to
January 2006 as the pre-intervention period i.e. period before the
launch of NREG and April 2007 to March 2008 as the post-intervention
period when NREG was available in the treatment districts but not in
the control districts (Fig. 1). We use the second year of NREG in Phase 1
districts as the post-intervention period to avoid programme im-
plementation glitches that may have been present in the first year of
implementation.
Our DID model uses the following equation:
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= + + + + +y α β NREG post δ γ εX( . )itd d t d t idtidt (1)
yitd refers to the dependent variable for an individual i in district d in
time t . The binary variable NREGd takes the value 1 for districts that
received NREG in Phase 1 and 0 for districts that received NREG in
Phase 3. The binary variable postt takes the value of 1 for the post-
NREG period (April 2007–March 2008) and 0 for the pre-NREG period
(January 2004–January 2006). Unobservable effects common to all
districts are captured by the district fixed effects (FE), δd and un-
observable effects common to all districts in a year are captured by the
year FE, γt. Matrix Xidt is the set of control variables. The main coef-
ficient of interest is β, which gives the treatment effect of NREG.
Specifically, it gives the “intent-to-treat” (ITT) which is the average
effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest for all individuals in
the treatment districts, irrespective of their participation in the scheme.
Thus, ITT captures the impact on all individuals where NREG is im-
plemented. We use a linear probability model as the interpretation of
interaction terms is controversial in non-linear probit or logit models
(Ai and Norton, 2003). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
district and household levels to account for serial correlation and
weights are used to adjust for survey sampling.
It was envisaged that NREG would be introduced in the most
backward districts first. When NREG was introduced, our data shows
Phase 1 districts had worse indicators than Phase 3 districts. Since, the
criteria used in identifying backward districts is not explained in the
policy, many studies have opted for a DID approach (Azam, 2012; Bose,
2017). DID has its advantage as it does not require the treatment and
control groups to have the same pre-intervention conditions, which are
controlled by district FE. However, for a DID results to be valid, it
should meet the parallel trends assumption i.e. districts in different
phases should have the same growth rates prior to NREG. Otherwise,
outcomes in the treatment and control groups could have been different
even in the absence of the scheme, resulting in biased estimates.
Furthermore, we conduct two robustness checks. First, we run DID,
comparing Phase 2 as treatment to Phase 3 as control districts. Since
backward districts could have been prioritised for Phase 1, it is likely
that Phase 2 and 3 districts are more similar. For this analysis, we
consider January 2004 to February 2007 as the pre-intervention period
when NREG was not available in both Phase 2 and 3 districts and April
2007 to March 2008 as the post-intervention period when NREG was
available in Phase 2 but not in Phase 3 districts. Second, as a falsifi-
cation test, we run DID for urban areas using the main model specifi-
cation. Since NREG is not available in urban areas, the DID estimate
should be insignificant.
2.3. Sub-group analyses
To explore heterogeneity of impact, we conduct two sub-group
analyses. Given that previous studies have reported low utilisation of
health services among poor and socially disadvantageous households
(Kesterton et al., 2010), we assess differential impacts of NREG for
these groups (poor and SC/ST). Since NREG provides manual work that
deters richer households from participating and because SC/ST are
prioritised for employment in NREG, we expect the poor and SC/ST to
benefit more from NREG and expect their healthcare utilisation to in-
crease.
2.4. Further analyses to test mechanisms
We conduct additional analyses to test possible mechanisms. First,
we expect that the introduction of NREG not only improves income it
also improves the infrastructure in a community that benefits everyone.
If this line of reasoning is correct, then NREG would have a greater
impact in regions where the infrastructure is likely to be weaker. Within
the constraints of the available data, we believe regions prone to nat-
ural disasters such as floods and droughts are likely to have weaker
infrastructure. Therefore, we analyse regions that are prone to natural
disasters. We identify disaster-prone regions using a variable that re-
cords if there was a flood or a drought in 2006 or 2007 in the primary
sampling unit. Second, given the unexpected result that facility de-
liveries reduced among poorer households, we test if this effect could be
because adult members find the opportunity cost of travelling to and
waiting at health facilities, while foregoing employment, too high. One
way to test this mechanism is to assess if NREG has reduced time al-
located towards other maternal and childcare activities such as ex-
clusive breastfeeding, which is also likely to keep an adult member
away from employment. Therefore, we estimate the impact of NREG on
duration of exclusive breastfeeding.
2.5. Data
The data comes from the Indian District Level Household and
Facility Survey (DLHS), one of the largest nationally representative
demographic and health surveys carried out in India. It is a repeated
cross-sectional survey and we use the data from DLHS-3 that was ad-
ministered in 2007–2008. It covered 720,320 households across 601
districts and 28 states and six union territories (excluding Nagaland).
The sampling frame was based on the 2001 census and used multistage
stratified sampling. In each district, 50 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) –
census villages for rural areas and wards for urban areas – were selected
Fig. 1. Timeline of the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) and DLHS survey.
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by systematic Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling and
within each sampled PSU, households were selected by circular sys-
tematic sampling (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2010).
Ethical approval was not sought as the data is available in the public
domain.
DLHS-3 provided individual, household and village information.
Basic demographic and socioeconomic information was collected from
household members. All ever-married women (aged 15–49) in the
household were interviewed regarding their use of maternal health
services for the most recent birth in the last five years. We use this
information to create records of children born using their month and
year of birth. As NREG was implemented in only rural areas, we restrict
our sample to rural households. We, therefore, have data on 127,879
children born during 2004–2008, covering the period before and after
the implementation of NREG (Fig. 1). For year 2008, we include birth
data up to March 2008, before Phase 3 of NREG started.
2.6. Variables
Our dependent variables measuring utilisation of healthcare are
selected based on the indicators available for a period of time, before
and after NREG was introduced. We study deliveries at health facilities
and include two additional variables: deliveries at home and borrowing
to cover facility delivery costs. Previous studies found strong financial
barriers to facility deliveries for poor and marginalised caste groups
(Kesterton et al., 2010). Since NREG aims to increase the income of
rural poor households, we expect to observe an increase in facility
deliveries, consequently a reduction in home deliveries, and a reduction
in the incidence of borrowing for these households. Mothers who re-
ported a facility delivery were asked if they borrowed money or sold
assets to cover costs related to facility deliveries, including out-of-
pocket costs. We have used this question to construct the borrow
variable.
We control for several child, mother and household characteristics,
which in previous studies have shown to be strong determinants of
utilisation of health services. These include sex of the child, religion and
caste of the household head, and mother's education, age at birth of
child, and number of previous births. We also control for household size
and wealth. For household wealth, we use the asset-based wealth index
provided in the DLHS. It is based on household ownership of durable
assets and housing conditions (e.g. water source and toilet facilities)
and is calculated using principal component analysis (Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, 2010). We use this index to create wealth
quintiles. This indicator reflects the relative wealth of the household as
compared to other households in the region. Due to the low level of
schooling in India, mothers' education is coded as never attended school
vs ever attended school. (See Table 1 for variable descriptions).
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
As seen from Table 1, in our sample, 37.32% of the deliveries were
at a health facility (22.43% in public and 14.61% in private) while
majority were home deliveries (61.15%). There is an increase in facility
deliveries in both Phase 1 (treatment) and Phase 3 (control) districts
after NREG – from 24.56% to 37.44% in Phase 1 and from 41.74% to
52.46% in Phase 3. Consequently, home deliveries have also reduced in
both Phase 1 and 3 districts after NREG. For 38% of the facility de-
liveries, households had to borrow money or sell assets, and this be-
came worse in both Phase 1 and 3 districts after NREG. Regarding other
indicators, our sample has more male (53.72%) than female children.
Close to 41% of the sample is SC/ST and above 80% is Hindu. Only half
of the mothers ever attended school and this increased after NREG.
Mother's average age at birth is 25 years, similar in both sets of districts.
3.2. Parallel trends
As shown in Fig. 2, the yearly mean of deliveries at a health facility,
public facility, at home, and borrowing are roughly parallel in the
treatment (Phase 1) and control (Phase 3) districts in 2004–2005 i.e.
before the introduction of NREG. This implies these indicators meet the
parallel trends assumption and DID can be applied to estimate the
impact of NREG. However, deliveries at private facilities do not show
parallel trends and therefore we cannot convincingly conclude the
change in private facility deliveries is caused by NREG. Hereafter, re-
sults pertaining to private facility deliveries are shaded as these results
need to be interpreted with caution.
3.3. Impact of NREG on maternal healthcare
The difference-in-differences estimates on the impact of NREG on
utilisation of maternal healthcare are shown in Table 2. We observe
that there is no impact of NREG on facility deliveries per se (column 1)
but if we disaggregate by the type of facility, we find deliveries in the
public facilities increased by 2.6 percentage points (column 2) while
there was no impact of NREG on home deliveries (column 4). Even
though we are unable to claim a causal impact of NREG on reduction in
private facility deliveries, the results suggest the increase in public fa-
cility deliveries is likely due to the reduction in deliveries at private
facility – rather than a shift from home to facility delivery. This suggests
that the introduction of NREG did not significantly increase utilisation
of facilities, but it may have shifted preference from private to public
facilities. From the results, we also find that due to the introduction of
NREG, borrowing for facility deliveries reduced by 2.1 percentage
points (at 10% significance, column 5).
3.4. Robustness checks
Table 3 presents the results of the falsification test i.e. estimating the
impact of NREG in urban areas. Since urban areas were not offered
NREG, as expected, we do not find any impact on facility deliveries
including in public facilities, and no impact on borrowing. However,
there is a reduction in home deliveries by 2.1 percentage points at 10%
significance.
Using Phase 2 districts as treatment and Phase 3 districts as control
(Table 4), we find NREG had a similar trend as our main results, but the
effect size is larger: facility deliveries increased by 3.3 percentage
points, public facility deliveries by 4.7 percentage points, home de-
liveries reduced by 3.4 percentage points while there was no change in
borrowing. In our main specification where we consider Phase 1 dis-
tricts as treatment, although the coefficients had the same signs as
above, the coefficients were smaller. We also found no change in home
deliveries while a decline in borrowing. This implies NREG had a larger
impact on facility deliveries in Phase 2 districts than in Phase 1 dis-
tricts. This may be because, on an average, Phase 1 districts were more
backward compared to Phase 2 districts, and hence implementation of
NREG could have been better in Phase 2 districts. It is also possible that
implementation of NREG improved over time and by the time it was
introduced in Phase 2 districts, it was running more smoothly.
3.5. Sub-group analyses
As seen in Table 5, among poorer households (wealth quintiles 1
and 2) facility deliveries reduced by 2.9 percentage points, with a re-
duction of 1.8 percentage points in public facility deliveries. Conse-
quently, deliveries at home increased by 2.7 percentage points. There
was no significant impact on borrowing. Contrary to our expectations,
this result indicates that utilisation of facility delivery amongst poorer
households reduced due to NREG. We explore possible reasons for this
observation in the mechanisms section.
For rich households (wealth quintiles 4 and 5), although there was
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no impact on overall facility deliveries, public facilities deliveries in-
creased by 4.0 percentage points. There was no impact on home de-
liveries and like poorer households, there was no impact on borrowing.
Even though we cannot be certain about the causal link that NREG led
to a decrease in private facility deliveries among richer households, the
results suggest that richer households may have shifted from private to
public facility. Since richer households are less likely to participate in
NREG, our results indicate they may have benefitted from indirect ef-
fects of NREG such as overall development that may have improved
access to health facilities. We explore this line of reasoning further
under mechanisms.
With regards to caste, there was no impact of NREG for margin-
alised castes (SC/ST) while non-SC/ST showed similar trends as richer
households: public facility deliveries increased by 4.2 percentage points
while there was no impact on facility and home deliveries. For non-SC/
ST borrowing reduced by 3.9 percentage points.
3.6. Mechanisms
As some of the sub-group analyses results were unexpected, we ran
additional analyses to explore two possible mechanisms. First, to test
the assumption that infrastructure development due to NREG positively
influences the utilisation of health facilities, we had a closer look at
regions that are prone to disasters (Table 6). Disasters such as floods
and droughts adversely impact infrastructure – and since NREG work
prioritises development of infrastructure damaged in disasters or build
infrastructure to protect from the adverse impact of disasters, we can
expect the impact of NREG on maternal healthcare to be greater in
disaster-prone districts. Even though this approach has limitations,
which are discussed later, the results lend support to our argument. We
find NREG increased deliveries at public facilities by 3.7 percentage
points in disaster-prone regions compared to an increase of 1.9 per-
centage points in regions that are not disaster-prone. Furthermore, in
disaster-prone regions, NREG increased facility delivery by 2.4
percentage points while reducing home deliveries by 2.8 percentage
points. This indicates that the availability of good public infrastructure,
often developed as part of NREG, can reduce barriers to facility utili-
sation. Finally, NREG also reduced borrowing in disaster-prone regions
by 4.2 percentage points, indicating that NREG may have provided
some financial protection in the rural areas that are prone to disasters.
Second, to test the assumption that introduction of NREG negatively
impacts allocation of household members’ time for maternal and child
health, we tested the impact of NREG on exclusive breastfeeding:
whether the child was exclusively breastfed for at least the first six
months after birth. The results indicate there was a 2.4 percentage point
reduction in exclusive breastfeeding due to NREG (Table 7). But what is
particularly relevant to our argument is that amongst poorer house-
holds there was a 2.7 percentage point reduction while there was no
impact on richer households. Furthermore, if the opportunity cost of
not being employed explains the negative impact of NREG on facility
deliveries amongst poorer household, then we would not expect to see
this effect among richer households that are less likely to be direct
beneficiaries of NREG. The sub-group analysis of richer households
presented in Table 5 confirms this view that there is no negative impact
on facility and home delivery.
4. Discussion
In this study we investigated the impact of NREG on utilisation of
maternal healthcare. We expected NREG to have a positive influence on
maternal health-seeking behaviour – specifically facility delivery due to
two main reasons: improvement in income and improvement in infra-
structure. First, NREG led to an increase in income as it provides em-
ployment during the lean season and it has also increased unskilled
wage rate for everyone in the region (Berg et al., 2012; Imbert and
Papp, 2015). By mandating equal wages irrespective of individual
characteristics such as gender or caste, an implicit objective of the
scheme is also to enforce a minimum wage that is often set above the
Table 1
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Overall Phase 1 districts (Treatment) Phase 3 districts (Control)
N=127,879 N=68,193 N=59,686
Pre-NREG Post-NREG Pre-NREG Post-NREG
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Facility Delivery in a health facility= 1; 0 otherwise 37.32 24.56 37.44 41.74 52.46
Public Delivery in a public health facility= 1; 0 otherwise 22.43 14.02 26.25 23.45 31.81
Private Delivery in a private health facility= 1; 0 otherwise 14.61 10.36 10.84 18.02 20.29
Home Delivery at home=1; 0 otherwise 61.15 72.86 61.86 55.84 46.99
Borrow Borrowed money or sold assets to cover costs associated with facility delivery= 1; 0
otherwise
38.36 43.15 44.26 32.94 35.51
Panel B: Independent Variables
Male Child born is a boy= 1; 0 if girl 53.72 54.77 51.74 57.23 51.75
SCST Household head belongs to ST/SC=1; 0 otherwise 40.77 45.28 46.77 33.80 35.38
Size No of members in the household 7.00 6.82 7.18 6.85 7.27
Education Mother has ever attended school= 1; 0 otherwise 50.42 40.95 43.85 58.33 61.03
Age Mother's age at birth 25.01 25.50 24.72 25.58 24.59
Births No of previous births of the mother 2.59 2.89 2.55 2.66 2.32
Religion Religion of the household head
Hindu 82.75 84.31 84.13 81.81 80.96
Muslim 12.32 11.42 11.92 12.26 13.32
Christian 4.93 4.27 3.95 5.92 5.83
Wealth Household wealth quintiles
Q1 (poorest 20%) 24.85 35.10 34.83 13.28 12.76
Q2 24.13 28.09 28.75 18.94 19.18
Q3 22.24 19.22 19.94 24.95 25.90
Q4 18.63 12.43 12.06 25.43 26.22
Q5 (richest 20%) 10.15 5.15 4.41 17.40 15.93
Notes: Percentages for categorical variables and means for continuous variables; unweighted. Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (SCST).
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current unskilled wage rate and therefore reduces wage discrimination
in rural areas. Furthermore, the NREG Act encourages participation of
women in the workforce by offering uniform wages across gender
(p.16) and mandating that a third of the NREG beneficiaries must be
women (p.14). This increases women's participation in NREG – espe-
cially among the rural poor (Afridi et al., 2016) and as Zimmermann
(2012) highlights, this has resulted in women's wages to increase sub-
stantially, making it more attractive for women to join the labour force.
Muralidharan et al. (2017) go on to show that while the wages for poor
households increased by 13 percent, it is overwhelmingly driven by the
market (90%) as opposed to the earnings from the programme (10%).
In essence, the increase in wage rates due to the introduction of NREG
benefits the whole community. Second, the NREG Act (2005) prioritises
infrastructure development that also benefits the entire community
(p.13). For instance, in a predominantly agrarian economy, irrigation
and flood protection, work prioritised in NREG, can prevent cata-
strophic shocks to the region and improve rural employment and in-
comes.
4.1. Impact on maternal healthcare
From the results, we observe an increase in preference towards
Fig. 2. Test of parallel trends between Phase 1 (treatment) and Phase 3 (control) districts before the introduction of NREG in February 2006.
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deliveries at public facilities. We expect this is due to the development
of infrastructure in the community that is carried out as part of NREG
projects. This is also in line with prior literature from India suggesting
that with improvement in infrastructures such as road connectivity and
flood control; people are more likely to access larger public facilities,
usually main hospitals in towns that are perceived to provide better
quality of care (Shah and Jose, 2009). Therefore, instead of going to
smaller private nursing homes, which are often unregulated and ex-
pensive, people prefer to go to public hospitals (Iyengar et al., 2009).
In addition, the sub-group analysis of disaster-prone regions is
particularly useful. In a largely subsistence agriculture economy, dis-
asters can have a severe impact on agricultural production, the main
source of income and employment for 55 percent of economically active
people in India (FAO, 2009). Such disasters have a greater impact on
rural poor who often do not have enough savings or assets to deal with
these shocks. Therefore, in areas that had a disaster, we would expect
higher uptake of NREG as poorer households are likely to recover any
loss of income by participating in NREG. Our results confirm that the
impact of NREG is greater in regions affected by disasters. We also see
an effect of NREG on the wider community as the development of in-
frastructure such as flood controls provide significant protection and
benefits to everyone. Similar results were reported by Desai et al.
(2015) who find that the impact of NREG on poverty reduction was
greater in regions that had less developed infrastructure.
4.2. Impact on facility delivery by household wealth
As discussed earlier, NREG is designed to provide employment to
the most vulnerable sections of the population. There is evidence that
NREG, albeit not perfect, is fairly well-targeted and directly benefits the
poor and marginalised populations in rural areas (Dey, 2017; Mehrotra,
2008; Ravi and Engler, 2015). There is also evidence that NREG im-
proved wages, child development indicators, and food security among
these groups (NCEUS, 2009). However, in our analysis, contrary to the
main expectation that the introduction of NREG will lead to an increase
in facility deliveries among the poor, we find NREG in fact reduced
facility deliveries.
We believe this unintended effect is because workfare programs
such as NREG are likely to raise the marginal cost of time for adults in
poorer households, thereby negatively impacting activities that limit
their time engaged in employment. This can influence the time spent on
a variety of activities including the cumulative time spent in travelling
to and waiting at health facilities. In essence, although income from
employment makes healthcare affordable, it can also put constraints on
how households allocate time to other activities. Going to a health fa-
cility or accompanying an expectant mother to a facility involves an
opportunity cost of forgoing income. As a result, the household may
prefer home delivery over delivery at a facility.
Prior research supports this line of reasoning - that in poorer
households, women's participation in employment especially through
workfare schemes, is often induced by poverty that is likely to have a
negative impact on the utilisation of maternal health services (Desai &
Jain, 1994; Gabrysch & Campbell, 2009). Studies from two Indian
states: Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Navaneetham and
Dharmalingam, 2002), as well as Nepal (Sharma et al., 2007), show that
working women are less likely to seek maternal health services at a
facility. This effect has also been observed in the context of welfare
schemes in developed countries. For instance, Haider et al. (2003) show
that in the US, a welfare reform that was restricted to providing em-
ployment to relatively poorer individuals, negatively impacted time
spent on maternal and child health activities. Most notably, they found
that breastfeeding would have been 5.5 percent higher in the absence of
the welfare reform. We also find similar results that indicate NREG had
a negative impact on exclusive breastfeeding among poorer households.
4.3. Impact on facility delivery by SC/ST status
Even though the NREG Act (2005) prioritises work on land owned
by SC/ST (p13), our analysis does not indicate any effect of NREG on
the health-seeking behaviour of SC/STs. On the other hand, we observe
an increase of 4.2 percentage points in public facility deliveries of non-
SC/STs due to NREG. Once again, even though we do not have evidence
for a causal impact of NREG on deliveries at private facilities for non-
SC/STs, the results suggest the increase in public facility deliveries
could be due to a shift in preference from private to public facilities –
much like the impact observed for richer households.
4.4. Limitations and future research
While our study provides insights into the impact of NREG on fa-
cility delivery, there are a number of limitations and areas of future
research that we would like to highlight. First, in estimating the impact
Table 2
Impact of NREG on utilisation of maternal health services: Difference-in-dif-
ferences estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Facility Public Private Home Borrow
DID 0.004 0.026*** −0.023*** −0.005 −0.021*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,355 77,948 77,948 78,053 29,365
R-squared 0.305 0.176 0.243 0.299 0.174
Notes: Controls include sex of the child, household head's religion and caste,
household size, household wealth, and mother's characteristics (education, age
at birth and number of previous births). Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 3
Falsification test: Impact of NREG in urban areas.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Facility Public Private Home Borrow
DID 0.020 0.014 0.006 −0.021* −0.017
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,777 26,905 26,905 26,944 18,875
R-squared 0.354 0.200 0.296 0.350 0.169
Notes: Controls include sex of the child, household head's religion and caste,
household size, household wealth, and mother's characteristics (education, age
at birth and number of previous births). Standard errors in parenthesis.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 4
Impact of NREG: Comparing phase 2 (treatment) and phase 3 (control) districts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Facility Public Private Home Borrow
DID 0.033*** 0.047*** −0.014*** −0.034*** 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 91,349 92,059 92,059 92,181 36,945
R-squared 0.309 0.179 0.242 0.302 0.169
Notes: Controls include sex of the child, household head's religion and caste,
household size, household wealth, and mother's characteristics (education, age
at birth and number of previous births).
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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of NREG on maternal healthcare, we capture intent-to-treat rather than
the impact on actual beneficiaries of the scheme. Second, while district
and year FEs control for other ongoing developmental initiatives, our
data does not capture all these initiatives. We were able to run a ro-
bustness test for the effect of the Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram
(JSSK), which provides cash transfer for maternal health services at
public facilities and find that the DID model adequately controls for
this. Another scheme that could have an influence is the National Rural
Health Mission (NRHM), which focuses on improving rural public
health systems. Since NRHM was implemented in the entire state at
once, rather than by districts, the DID estimates should have controlled
for this. However, further research, perhaps using data from individual
states, to investigate the effect of these initiatives separately would be
very useful. Third, by design, we are limited in our analysis to observe
only the early effect of NREG. It is possible that the effect changes over
time. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) studied patterns of participation in
poverty reduction programmes in India and found that although non-
poor tend to be the first to benefit when programmes are introduced,
the benefits to the poor emerge later. However, in a study of an EGS
scheme in Maharashtra, Gaiha (2000) observed inequity between the
rich and poor increased over time. In our robustness check, when we
use Phase 2 districts as the treatment, we find the impact of NREG is
greater than when using Phase 1 districts as treatment. This could imply
implementation of NREG improved over time as Phase 2 districts re-
ceived NREG later and could also be because Phase 2 districts were on
an average less backward as compared to Phase 1 districts. Never-
theless, to understand the long-term impacts, further studies would be
beneficial. And finally, our attempts at exploring the causal mechanism
to explain the results of facility delivery by household wealth is greatly
limited by the availability of data. We have used household assets to
identify poor and rich households. Assets are commonly used as a proxy
for household wealth in low- and middle-income countries – it reflects
the relative wealth of the household as compared to other households in
the region. Although there may be changes in household income due to
NREG, household assets tend to remain stable over time (Liverpool-
Tasie and Winter-Nelson, 2011) and households moving from Q1/Q2 to
Q4/Q5 are likely to be very few. Similarly, the proxy variable for dis-
aster-prone areas uses data from only one round of the survey. Re-
searchers are likely to benefit by using a more nuanced approach/data –
perhaps using a mixed methods design to investigate these as well as
other mechanisms.
5. Conclusion
EGS are a popular mechanism often used by policymakers to address
issues of income security. According to the World Development Report
(2014), in sub-Saharan Africa alone, around 150 EGS are currently
active, and Subbarao (2003) enumerates several large-scale EGS pro-
grammes in Asia and Latin America from the 1980s and 1990s. While
researchers and policymakers are predominantly interested in the im-
pact of these schemes on the primary objective: improvement in income
security; our analysis shows, EGSs can also have an impact on health-
seeking behaviour – specifically maternal healthcare utilisation. In
conclusion, we would like to highlight two such areas of impact of EGS
on maternal healthcare as observed from the case of NREG in India.
First, we find that there is no significant increase in utilisation of ma-
ternal healthcare. This suggests that income security alone does not
reduce barriers to utilisation. Second, we find a significant increase in
home deliveries amongst poorer households indicating that EGSs may
in fact introduce unintended barriers that reduce utilisation and
therefore increase inequity. We acknowledge that our study considers
Table 5
Subgroup analyses: Difference-in-differences estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Facility Public Private Home Borrow
Panel A:
Poor Households (Q1&2) −0.029*** −0.018** −0.010* 0.027*** −0.035
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.023)
Rich Households (Q4&5) −0.009 0.040*** −0.051*** 0.011 −0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Panel B:
SCST=1 −0.010 −0.002 −0.009 0.009 0.025
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.022)
SCST=0 0.012 0.042*** −0.032*** −0.013 −0.039***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Notes: All models include year and district FEs. Other controls include sex of the child, household head's religion and caste (except Panel B), household size,
household wealth (except in Panel A), and mother's characteristics (education, age at birth and number of previous births). Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes
(SCST). Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 6
Impact of NREG in disaster-prone regions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Facility Public Private Home Borrow
Disaster= 1 0.024** 0.037*** −0.015* −0.028** −0.042*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.022)
Disaster= 0 −0.007 0.019** −0.026*** 0.007 −0.013
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Notes: All models include year and district FEs. Other controls include sex of the
child, household head's religion and caste, household size, household wealth,
and mother's characteristics (education, age at birth and number of previous
births). Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 7
Impact of NREG on exclusive breastfeeding.
(1) (2) (3)
All sample Poor households Rich households
DID −0.024*** −0.027*** −0.011
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65,949 31,961 18,962
R-squared 0.169 0.179 0.193
Notes: Dependent variable is whether the child was exclusively breastfed for at
least six months after birth. Controls include sex of the child, household head's
religion and caste, household size, household wealth, and mother's character-
istics (education, age at birth and number of previous births). Standard errors
are in parenthesis.
s***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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the immediate impact of an EGS in India, however, given the popularity
of such schemes, we would like to conclude with a call for more in-
depth and long-term research into the impact of EGS on utilisation of
maternal healthcare.
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